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Abstract This paper explores the relationship between globalization and party positions 
accounting for potential differences between left- and right-wing parties. According to our 
theoretical priors we expect that parties respond to globalization in a different way depending on 
their ideology and social groups of representation. The empirical analysis is based on a panel 
model of 34 political parties in 17 Western European countries between 1970 and 2010. We find 
that right-wing parties move leftward in response to globalization while left-wing parties do not 
alter their position, or move rightward. Additionally, we find that parties ideological positions 
are affected by foreign parties’ positions of the same ideological bloc giving support to party 
policy diffusion argument. The main findings appear remarkably robust to additional econometric 
techniques such as instrumental variables, Jackknife and methods that account for cross-sectional 
dependence. The findings in total give support for the existence of party system convergence 
towards left due to the right-wing party moderation. 
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1. Introduction 
The positions that political parties strategically choose, have been the focus of debate in both 
economics and political science. A vast literature finds that parties in industrialized democracies 
respond to voter preferences (e.g. McDonald & Budge, 2005; Adams et al., 2004). Besides voter 
preferences, however, other factors related to economy and society can influence party 
competition. One of the most prominent such factors is higher economic integration (Adams et 
al., 2009; Ward et al., 2011). Economic integration, however, is only one aspect of a multifaceted 
phenomenon, i.e. globalization. Developed economies, especially in Western Europe, have 
undergone substantial changes in the social and political realm which may have influenced 
equally the position of political parties. With this paper, we contribute to the existing literature 
by examining the effect of various aspects of globalization on the positions that parties announce 
in their pre-election programs.  
So far, the results of the relevant literature are mixed. Adams et al. (2009) and Haupt 
(2010) derive a significant effect of economic globalization on parties’ ideological position. 
However, they find that this effect can be positive or negative depending on the measure of 
economic globalization. Ward et al. (2011) avoid this problem using the single KOF index for 
economic globalization,1 finding that globalization moves parties in a rightward direction, only 
if the position of the median voter is relatively far to the left. The above studies indicate a 
meaningful relationship between economic globalization and party position, but the effect of 
multifaceted nature of globalization on parties remains unclear. We contribute to this literature 
by focusing on all facets of globalization, using the KOF indices for economic, social and political 
globalization and trying to find the effect of them on parties’ positions, taking into account the 
differences among political parties related to their ideological bloc. To our knowledge this is the 
first paper that undertakes this task. 
While “social globalization” applies to the communication among people from different 
countries, as well as informational and cultural flows among countries, the term “political 
globalization” refers to the participation of a country in the international political arena.2 We 
argue that political parties are affected by the different dimensions of globalization (economic, 
                                                          
1 KOF index for economic globalization includes trade flows, portfolio, foreign direct investment, tariff and barriers 
to trade and capital controls (Dreher, 2006a; Dreher et al., 2008a). 
2 Specifically, along the lines of Dreher (2006a) the economic globalization is related to actual economic flows and 
restrictions on trade and capital; the social globalization refers to information flows, personal contacts and cultural 
proximity; and the political globalization is related to the participation of the country in international agreements, 
organizations and missions. 
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social and political) because they are all linked with the functioning of the economy and behavior 
of the economic agents/voters. For example, as Rodrik (1998) has shown, economic globalization 
shapes both the economy and voters’ preferences for economic and social policies. Along similar 
lines, social globalization changes the social coherence of a country, affecting voters’ preferences 
about labor and social issues (Dreher and Gaston, 2007).  
Even though globalization can have a direct effect on parties’ positions, it can have an 
indirect effect by creating common ideological trends among parties in different countries 
(Kayser, 2009). For this reason, in our empirical model we go beyond the standard practice and 
add a variable that captures the positions of ideologically close parties in other European 
countries. As social, political and economic ties among European states become more 
pronounced, voters might be influenced by the behavior of their “neighbors”. At the same time, 
parties might adopt similar positions as their peers in other countries. Recent studies in the so-
called policy diffusion literature have found strong evidence that parties are responsive to policy 
positions of foreign incumbent parties (Böhmelt et al. 2016; Ezrow et al., 2017) while other 
studies have shown that parties respond to domestic rival parties of the same party-family (Adams 
and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Williams 2015). Our analysis complements these studies by evaluating 
if parties respond to foreign parties of the same ideological bloc either they were in government 
or not. 
In addition, the findings suggest that the effect of globalization is not symmetric across 
parties indicating a party system convergence to the left due to the right-wing party moderation. 
This argument is consistent with the idea that globalization makes the positions of left-wing 
parties more attractive to voters (Walter, 2010); either because globalization increases the income 
volatility (e.g. Rodrik, 1998) or because it makes voters more flexible to social issues through the 
spread of ideas and culture. Thus, our analysis is related to a third strand of the literature; the 
Partisan Theory literature where numerous studies show that left- and right-wing parties have 
different response to economic conditions such as inflation, unemployment and economic 
integration (e.g. Hibbs, 1987; Herwartz and Theilen, 2014). Interestingly, some studies find that 
economic integration leads parties to converge in economic policies positions (e.g. Dorussen and 
Nanou, 2013; Ward et al., 2015) but they do not identify the direction (left or right) of this 
convergence.  
The empirical analysis relies on a panel dataset of 34 political parties in 17 Western 
European countries, over the period 1970-2010. Our model specification considers a range of 
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unobservable characteristics by using party-level fixed effects to account for different 
constitutional and historical characteristics that led to the creation of each party. Additionally, we 
control for the possible influence of parties in other countries by including the average position 
of foreign parties. Finally, we add a set of control variables related to economic, demographic 
and political factors that may influence party position. 
Our dependent variable is an additive left-right index of party ideological position coming 
from the Manifesto Project database3 while as main independent variable, we use KOF 
globalization indices (economic, social, political and total) to estimate the multifaceted nature of 
globalization (Dreher, 2006a). The main findings suggest that party positions are affected by the 
different dimensions of globalization that create party system convergence, with right-wing 
parties moving leftward. 
As time-varying omitted variables might bias our results, we use an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach which mitigates concerns of potential endogeneity. Our main instrument is 
motivated by Hickman and Olney (2011), who find that countries with higher levels of human 
capital tend to be more globalized. Thus, human capital index is used as instrument for 
globalization, which has zero correlation with parties’ ideological positions and high correlation 
with globalization.4 Likewise, comparable results are taken under additional robustness tests. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and introduces the empirical specification. Section 4 
presents the main empirical results while Section 5 includes the robustness check of our 
estimations. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main points. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The link between political parties and globalization has been examined by both economists and 
political scientists. An extensive literature has shown that economic globalization strongly affects 
social and economic policies (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997, 1998; Garrett, 1998; Adam and 
Kammas, 2007; Dreher et al., 2008b; Leibrecht et al., 2011). Similarly, studies have found a 
significant effect of social globalization on public spending and labor or redistributive policies 
(Dreher. 2006b; Berg and Nilsson, 2010; Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012). Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
3 The additive left-right index, called rile by the Manifesto Project, subtracts the percentage of 13 aggregated left 
categories from 13 aggregated right categories (Budge et al., 2001). This index has been characterized as more 
reliable than any single coding category in the Manifesto Project by Mikhaylov, Laver & Benoit (2012). 
4 The correlation coefficient with both economic and social globalization is equal to 0.7. 
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estimated results are ambiguous and leave an opening for doubt about the precise effect of 
globalization on political parties. 
While the focus of these studies is the political outcome after elections, our focus is on policy 
positions that every party takes prior to the elections. The governmental action, however, is 
directly connected to our analysis – which includes parties either participating in government or 
not – because governments are nothing else than political parties coming to power through their 
electoral programs. Our main hypothesis assumes that political parties respond to globalization 
in a different way depending on their ideology and party’s identity.5 A rich literature has 
addressed the importance of partisan responses to globalization. In this setting, left-wing parties 
are inherently ideologically distant from right-wing parties and appeal to different social group 
of voters (e.g. Hibbs, 1987; Boix, 1998; Hwang and Lee, 2014). While taking into account all 
dimensions of globalization we argue that globalization makes the positions of mainstream left-
wing parties more attractive to the public, either in economic or/and social issues, so right-wing 
parties are motivated to move leftward in order not to lose support.  
The rationale behind this argument is based on various studies which show that globalization 
increases the demand for left-wing policies, e.g. more social spending. For example, proponents 
of the so-called compensation effect argue that globalization creates insecurities, increases the 
demand for insurance against the external risk, and hence governments respond to this demand 
by expanding social spending (Rodrik, 1998; Burgoon, 2012). In this setting, political parties as 
agents respond by satisfying this demand. At the same time, voters as they become globally 
interconnected, they observe policies in other countries, e.g. redistributive policies, transfers, 
labor market policies, and they demand similar policies in their country.6 
Consequently, there are good reasons to expect that globalization has a significant effect on 
party’s ideological position; and this effect is conditioned to the ideological group in which party 
belongs. Since globalization erodes the support for (pro-market) right-wing parties, the latter 
respond by adopting positions closer to their rivals, i.e. (pro-redistributive) left-wing parties. To 
evaluate this argument, we propose the following testable proposition: 
                                                          
5 The term party’s identity refers to the ideological group of a party, e.g. social democratic, Christian democratic, 
conservative etc. 
6 For example, Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) have shown that social globalization has a positive influence on 
government spending, because people observe the government size in other countries and demand more expenditure 
in their country and government respond to this demand. 
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Globalization creates party convergence to the left due to the right-wing party moderation (H1). 
Going one step further, we expect that the above hypothesis (denoted as H1) is robust across 
different dimensions of globalization, i.e. economic, social and political, since all of them affect 
equally the economic environment and voter perceptions. Therefore we expect that right-wing 
parties move leftward in an increase of economic, social or political globalization. This produces 
the following testable sub-hypothesis:  
Party convergence towards left appears in any increase of economic, social or political 
globalization (H1a). 
In the following sections, we evaluate the validity of the above hypotheses through an 
empirical analysis whose findings contribute to the literature, giving remarkable explanations for 
the emerging results. 
3. Data and Empirical Specification 
3.1. Measuring party position 
We construct an annual panel dataset, where the cross-sectional units are 34 political parties 
across 17 Western European countries. The time period considered is from 1970 to 2010. We 
include two types of parties of each country, a Centre-left and a Centre-right party, which satisfy 
two mayor constraints. First, we consider only mainstream parties, as they are more credible in 
their electoral programs than niche parties (see Adams et al., 2006).7 Electoral programs of 
mainstream parties consist of feasible positions as they are more likely to enter the government, 
and thus are subject to (post) electoral cost (Dorussen and Nanou, 2013). Secondly, we consider 
parties that have a long-standing representation in electoral competition by participating in at 
least four national elections from 1970 to 2010. We do so, because parties with long participation 
in elections have a bigger electoral cost than parties with short participation and they move their 
position more conscious and strategic. Given these two requirements we end up having more 
centrist parties. The extreme left and right parties of the sample fail at being considered as 
mainstream and they typically receive a relatively low vote share.  
Given the above considerations we have Centre-left parties (typically Social democratic 
parties) and Centre-right parties (typically Christian democratic parties). In the case of Great 
                                                          
7Adams et al. (2006) have shown that mainstream parties respond to the environmental incentives while “niche” 
parties (e.g. Green, Communist) have a low responsiveness due to their strict policy beliefs. 
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Britain and France we use the Conservative parties as no Christian democratic parties have 
participated more than once in elections. The data for party’s ideological bloc are based on the 
Manifesto Project classification of party families. All the included parties and descriptive 
statistics of the variables employed are presented in Appendix (see Table A1, A2). 
In order to evaluate the testable hypotheses, we use a measure for party positioning on 
ideological scale (left-right) which is derived from the database of Manifesto Project8 and has 
been used in numerous studies (e.g. Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010; Ward et al., 2011). This 
measure represents parties’ ideological positions with registered references about a broad 
spectrum of policies related to state intervention in the economy, education and labor issues, social 
policies, nationalism and traditional values. These registered references are based on parties’ 
electoral programs which are considered as well-researched and carefully executed attempts to 
shape election outcome by affecting the public (Green and Hobolt, 2008). We focus on party’s 
ideological position because this measure captures the primary basis of political competition 
across national settings (Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014; McDonald and Budge, 2005) and reflects the 
image and differentiation of a party compared to another in all that issues which can be related 
with multifaceted phenomenon i.e., globalization. 
Thus, the dependent variable is a measure, labeled as party’s ideological position, which 
ranges from -100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right).9 It shows the point of a party’s position 
in ideological scale, according to its official electoral program (manifesto) at every national 
election.10 The Manifesto Project database provides data about position of each party separately, 
even if the party belongs to a coalition. In general, a positive coefficient of this measure indicates 
a move to the right, implying policies in favor of market deregulation, retrenchments in crisis, 
reduction of welfare state or/and favor mentions for traditional values and national way of life. 
Instead, a negative coefficient indicates a move to the left which implies policies promoting 
market regulation, expansion of welfare state, favorable measures to labor groups, state 
intervention into the economy and internationalism. 
                                                          
8 Budge et al. (2001), Klingemann et al. (2006), Volkens et al. (2016). 
9 This measure indicates the left-right position as given in Michael Laver and Ian Budge (1992) and is constructed 
by subtracting the aggregated categories related with left positions from the aggregated categories related with right 
positions. It includes quasi-sentences about welfare state, education, economic planning, market regulation, 
traditional moral values, nationalism and labor groups. 
10 Electoral programs are being written before every election and express party’s position until the next elections 
when updated programs are being written. The position of a party is announced at the year of election and we assume 
that party keeps this position until the next election. As Imbeau (2009) mentions in most countries there is a link 
between the electoral program of a party and the policies that adopted by that political party after the elections.  
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3.2. Measuring globalization 
Our main independent variables are the KOF globalization indices as developed by Dreher 
(2006a). We use the separate indices for economic, social and political globalization and an 
overall index which covers all these three dimensions of globalization.11 The use of Dreher’s 
indices helps us to estimate the effect of globalization in the economic, social and political fields 
which has been on the rise since the 1970s.12After all, as Dreher et al. (2008a) mentions 
“globalization is a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, 
cultures, technologies, governance and produce complex relations of mutual interdependence”. 
 Specifically, the three indices of globalization are defined as: economic globalization, 
closely related with actual flows of trade, investments, income payments to foreign nationals and 
restrictions on trade and capital flows; social globalization, characterized by the communication 
among people from different countries (e.g. telecom traffic, stock of foreign population), 
information flows (e.g. internet users, international newspaper traded) and cultural proximity 
(e.g. trade books); and political globalization, expressed as the international political integration 
(e.g. number of international agreements and embassies in a country).13 As the KOF indices are 
highly correlated, each of them is used in a separate regression.14 However, an index comprising 
all three above indices is also used (denoted as total globalization). All globalization indices 
range from 1 (minimum value of globalization) to 100 (maximum value of globalization). 
 As we have argued in the previous sections, globalization is also expected to work through 
the transmission of the ideology of neighboring parties. Therefore, besides the variable which 
directly measures globalization, empirical model includes a variable labeled as 
foreign_party_position to control if the position of a party depends on the positions of similar 
foreign parties, namely parties of the same ideological bloc. In simple terms, we control if the 
ideological position of a Centre-left (Centre-right) party in a country, e.g. Spain, is affected by 
the average of positions of Centre-left (Centre-right) parties in all other countries of the sample. 
Hence, foreign_party_position is the arithmetic average of the positions that similar foreign 
parties take and is expressed by the equation below: 
                                                          
11 Dreher (2006a); updated in Dreher et al (2008a). 
12 Moreover, as can be seen from Table A.2 in Appendix the mean value of all the three globalization indices are 
quite high in our sample. 
13 For more information see Dreher (2006a). 
14 We run the model including all globalization indices in the same regression and the results remain unchanged. 
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where the numerator shows the sum of the positions of parties, in all other countries except i , 
which belong in the same ideological group with party j . The denominator, n , represents the 
number of similar parties in other countries of the sample and is equal to sixteen (16).15 We have 
also calculated the weighted average of parties’ positions in other countries using as weight the 
inverse of the distance of GDP per capita between country i  and k  but the results remain the 
same.16 However, the baseline specification includes the variable foreign_party_position ( jit ) 
without weights as European parties can be affected by the common trend of parties in the rest of 
Europe, regardless of the level of GDP per capita or even more the geographical distance among 
countries.  
In line with existing studies (Böhmelt et al., 2016), we have also calculated the average 
of positions of foreign incumbent parties (foreign_incumbent_parties) to control if successful 
foreign parties are more influential. This variable is the arithmetic average of similar foreign 
parties that were part of the government or government coalition during the last election year in 
their countries and it is used in estimates presented in Appendix (see Table A3). The data in 
incumbency status come from Döring and Manow (2016). Accordingly, the baseline model is 
formulated as follows: 
 
  10 1 2 3 jitjit it itPosition b b Globalization b leftxGlobalization b       
                         4 it j t jitb X                                
(2) 
where Positionjit represents the ideological position of party j  in country i  at time t . The model 
is based on yearly data hence each party’s position between elections is assigned its value at the 
last election.17 As mentioned in study of Osterloh and Debus (2012), the positions included in 
parties’ manifestos are strongly linked with the actual subsequent policies that are implemented 
during the period until the next elections. However, we re-estimate the core model including only 
                                                          
15 The sample includes 34 parties, 17 left-wing and 17 right-wing parties, so the number of left-wing or right-wing 
parties in other countries except country i  is equal to sixteen ( 16n ). 
16The estimated results with the weighted average are available upon request. 
17 Manifesto Project provides information for election years; therefore, in our model, which is based on yearly data, 
the position of each party is measured at every election year and remains the same until the next elections where 
takes a new value. 
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election years and the findings remain unchanged (see Table A4 in Appendix). Globalizationit 
denotes the globalization rate in country i , where party j  belongs, at time t  and takes the value 
of only one index of globalization (economic, social, political or total) in each regression to avoid 
problems with multicollinearity. The term leftxGlobalizationit is the interaction term between 
globalization and the dummy for center-left parties, which takes the value 0 for center-right 
parties and value 1 for center-left parties. Following Böhmelt et al. (2016) we assume that it takes 
time for a party to respond to positions of foreign parties and therefore we use the lag value of 
the average of parties’ positions in other countries . Finally, Xit includes the additional 
control variables of country i  where party j  belongs at time t  and εjit is the error term. 
To decide between the use of fixed effects or random effects we applied the standard 
Hausman test which showed that the appropriate specification is the fixed effects model. As the 
Hausman test shows that the proper specification is the Fixed Effects model, equation (2) includes 
party fixed effects γj to eliminate bias because of the effect of unmeasured that are strictly 
exogenous and, time effects δt. 18 Importantly, the dummy variable for left-wing parties ( left ) is 
not included in the model specification as a single independent variable because it is already 
included in party fixed effects γj. 
3.3 Other independent variables 
The rest of the independent variables follow the existing literature (see e.g. Dreher et al., 2008b; 
Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012). Specifically, we use control variables related to economic, 
demographic and political factors. Also following the rationale of the existing literature (see e.g., 
Adams et al., 2009; Haupt, 2010; Ward et al., 2011), we model party positions as a dynamic 
process by adding a lagged dependent variable which captures the position of the party at the 
previous national election. Therefore, we control for party position persistence in time as it is 
natural to assume that a party’s past behavior has a high degree of correlation with its current 
ideological position.  
Regarding the rest of the control variables, we first use the growth rate of GDP per capita 
(growth). The sign of this variable is a priori ambiguous; low growth rates may lead parties to 
move leftward to confront recession, but on the other hand leftist positions consistent with 
expansionary fiscal spending are more likely to come up at times of economic prosperity, i.e. 
                                                          
18 We conclude that time effects are needed in our model test after applying an F test which indicate that time 
dummies are significant. 
1 jit
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when growth rates are high (Dreher 2006a; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014). The second control is the 
inflation rate (inflation) as measured by the GDP deflator. According to studies on Partisan 
Cycles (e.g. Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Herwartz and Theilen, 2014) higher rates of inflation 
affect mainly right-wing parties by moving them rightward in order to control inflation, and leave 
left-wing parties uninfluenced. For this reason, we also include the interaction term between 
inflation and left-wing parties (leftxinflation). 
To take into account the level of development in every country, a country’s relative 
income (relative_income) is included in the set of regressors. This variable is measured as the 
proportion of a country’s GDP per capita in relation to the average sample GDP per capita. We 
also include a demographic variable, the age dependency ratio (dependency), which is measured 
by the number of persons in the age group 0-15 and 65+, as a ratio of the working age population. 
A higher rate of inactive population leads parties towards left with more social spending and 
measures favorable for vulnerable groups (Leibrecht et al., 2011). All the above controls are taken 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicator Database. 
 The last control variable is related to political factors and electoral system of the country 
in which party belongs. This variable is the effective number of parties (Eff_No_parties) which 
weights the number of parties in the legislature by their vote share and is taken from the 
Armingeon et al. (2015) published dataset. The inclusion of this variable in the model captures 
the effect of changes in the institutional system in the same country across time (Dorussen and 
Nanou, 2013).19 Generally, proportional systems tend to have more parties than non-proportional 
systems and parties’ positions probably depend on whether they compete with multiple or few 
parties. However, we do not have an a priori expectation on the sign of this variable. 
Finally, we estimate an additional dynamic fixed effects model with a lagged dependent 
variable which is formulated as follows:  
 ititjitjit lizationleftxGlobabionGlobalizatbPositionbbPosition 32110    
                       jittjitjit Xbb    514                                                                        (3) 
Model in equation (3) is exactly the same with this one in equation (2), with the only difference 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, 1jitPosition , which is the position of party j  in 
country i  at the previous national election.20 Note that in our dataset the time length (T) of our 
                                                          
19 The corresponding effect across countries is captured by the fixed effects estimator. 
20 Lagged dependent variable is frequently used to eliminate possible serial correlation in the residuals of the sample. 
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panel is greater than 35 and higher than the number of cross units, i.e. parties (N). Hence, the 
“Nickell bias” (Nickell, 1981) is negligible as it diminishes with increasing time periods (Beck 
and Katz, 2011).21 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section we present the main results of the empirical model, as well as a variety of 
robustness tests in order to verify the validity of them. Our aim is to identify the aspects of 
globalization that affect political parties and find out the precise effect of them on parties’ 
positions, controlling for partisan differences. All the regressions are estimated with time and 
party fixed effects and the standard errors are estimated as Robust Clustered Standard Errors in 
order to control for both heteroskedasticity and correlation of the error terms (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
4.1. Baseline results 
The main results are reported in Table 1, where the baseline equation (2) is estimated four times 
using a different index of globalization in each regression (total, economic, social and political). 
The estimates reported in columns (2), (4), (6), (8) include all the covariates introduced above, 
while those in columns (1), (3), (5), (7) include only the main independent variable and the 
interaction term with dummy for left-wing parties. As can be seen, the results remain significant 
even in regressions without control variables except the results for political globalization. 
However, R-squared is higher in regressions including the all the covariates indicating that the 
model is better specified with the inclusion of control variables. 
[Table 1, here] 
In the first two columns, we estimate the baseline model using the index of total 
globalization which covers all the three dimensions of globalization (economic, social and 
political). The coefficient of Total_globalization is statistically significant at the 1% level and the 
negative sign indicates that an increase of total globalization moves Centre-right parties to more 
left positions. On the other hand the coefficient of interaction term Total_global.xleft (1.341) has 
a positive sign and is of similar magnitude as the coefficient of Total_globalization (-1.104). 
Given that the effect of total globalization on Centre-left parties is the sum of coefficients of 
Total_globalization and Total_global.xleft, which seems to be small (-1.104 + 1.341 = 0.237), 
the implementation of an F-test is necessary to determine the significance of this effect. However, 
                                                          
21 As T>N, a dynamic GMM estimator is not advisable (see Roodman, 2009). 
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the F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that Centre-left parties remain 
unresponsive to total globalization. In substantive terms, a one standard deviation increase in total 
globalization is associated with an approximately one standard deviation leftward movement for 
Centre-right parties and with no movement for Centre-left parties.22 Consequently, the results 
indicate that globalization leads Centre-right parties to adopt more left positions giving support 
to the main hypothesis (H1) about party system convergence towards left. 
Regressions in the next columns suggest that the result of total globalization mentioned 
above is driven by all the dimensions of globalization – economic, social and political – since all 
indices of globalization appear statistically significant coefficients at the 1% and 5% level in all 
regressions (columns 3-8). These results give support to the sub-hypothesis (H1a) argument under 
which party system convergence towards left is robust across all the dimensions of globalization. 
Therefore, economic, social and political globalization are critical factors for shaping policy and 
politics as they affect party competition by leading to party system convergence. 
More specifically, the coefficients of economic, social and political globalization have the 
same negative sign and statistical significance with those of total globalization; consequently, the 
estimated results for right-wing parties remain the same as above. Left-wing parties, on the other 
hand, do not alter their position in response to economic and political  globalization23 and they 
move rightward in response to social globalization since the sum of the coefficients of 
Social_globalization and Social_global.xleft is equal to 0.401 and statistically significant at the 
5% level.24 Therefore, right-wing parties appear a leftward movement in response to every 
dimension of globalization whereas left-wing parties remain irremovable in the face of economic 
and political globalization but make a rightward movement in response to social globalization. 
The leftward movement of Centre-right parties is relatively bigger than the corresponding 
rightward movement of Centre-left parties in response to social globalization, indicating a 
convergence towards left. The findings about Centre-left parties and economic globalization are 
consistent with those of previous studies which find that left-wing parties are less responsive to 
economic globalization than right-wing parties (Adams et al., 2009; Haupt, 2010). 
                                                          
22 Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in total globalization (11.2) leads Centre-right parties to a 12.4-
point leftward movement (i.e. 3/4 of standard deviation of Centre-right party’s position). 
23 According to F-test the null hypothesis is not rejected in both cases, so the effect of economic and political 
globalization on Centre-left party’s position seems to be insignificant. 
24 The statistical significance of the coefficient results from the implementation of an F-test which rejects the null 
hypothesis of insignificant coefficient at the 5% level. 
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Regarding the substantive magnitude of these effects, a one standard deviation increase 
in economic globalization leads right-wing parties to move their position 12-point towards left. 
The corresponding substantive effect of social and political globalization on Centre-right party’s 
position is 8-point and 4-point, respectively, leftward movement.25 On the other hand, left-wing 
parties do not show any movement in an increase of economic or political globalization but they 
move their position 6-point towards right in a one standard deviation increase of social 
globalization. Although the two types of parties move to opposite directions in the face of social 
globalization, the leftward movement of right-wing parties is greater than the rightward 
movement of Centre-left parties, indicating that right-wing parties come closer to the position of 
left-wing parties. Given that Centre-left parties remain in the same position or move rightward, 
whereas right-wing parties move leftward, a convergence between political parties emerges in 
response to every dimension of globalization. 
Although all dimensions of globalization lead parties to converge in their positions, the 
explanation of the effect of each of them can be different, as every dimension of globalization is 
related to a different type of integration. For example, economic globalization imposes 
constraints on the potential positions that parties can adopt because it is perceived as threat by a 
big part of society which demand more left position in order to be secured (Rodrik, 1998). In 
simple terms, economic globalization makes the position of mainstream left-wing parties more 
attractive to voters who demand more left policies, such as state intervention, social sending 
expansion etc. Therefore, mainstream left-wing parties, such as social democrats, have no 
incentive to move rightward and at the same time they cannot move leftward due to the fear of 
capital flight abroad causing weakness of financing public expenditures. On the other hand, 
Centre-right parties possess positions in favor of middle and up class and they cannot move 
further to the right in response to economic globalization because they risk losing support from a 
part of middle class. Instead they need to move leftward in order to make their position more 
attractive to those of middle class that feel vulnerable against economic globalization. 
The effect of social globalization, however, can be attributed to a different explication. 
While economic globalization creates insecurities, social globalization informs voters for 
possible externalities and facilitates the transmission of ideas, making the society more open to 
other cultures and foreign population. Therefore, Centre-right parties relax their ideological 
                                                          
25 We mention the standardized coefficients because of allowing assessment of the relative size of the associations 
of independent variable with the dependent variable. The standard deviation of economic globalization is equal to 
14.22, of social globalization is equal to 14.35 while standard deviation of political globalization is equal to 12.92. 
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position to appear more sensitive to social issues. However, at the same time social integration 
informs workers about the negative externalities, making them to recognize their limited 
bargaining power and hence union membership is reduced (Dreher and Gaston, 2007). Since 
union members are more linked with Centre-left parties, the latter move their position to the right 
because their target group of voters is reduced. Yet, a part of society might perceive social 
globalization as a threat for the nation and demand positions further to the right, but this group of 
people appeals to extreme right-wing parties which are niche parties and are excluded of our 
analysis. 
Furthermore, the estimated results in Table 1 indicate the existence of an interaction 
among political parties from different countries, as the coefficient of the average of foreign 
parties’ positions (Foreign_party_position) bears a statistical significant coefficient at the 1% 
level in all the regressions. In simple terms, this suggests that a Centre-left (Centre-right) party 
in a country is affected by the average of Centre-left (Centre-right) parties’ positions in other 
European countries at the previous year. The negative sign, however, indicates that parties move 
their position in an opposite direction from the average of similar foreign parties at the previous 
year. This finding is contrary to expectations that European parties of the same ideological group 
obtain common positions, but is not irrational. Parties might try to separate themselves from the 
average in Europe, especially when the positions of similar parties in other countries are 
disapproved by society.  
Considering that this effect might occur because the average of foreign parties’ positions 
includes both incumbent and not incumbent parties, we re-estimate the model using the average 
of foreign incumbent parties only. The estimated results are presented in Table A3 (in Appendix) 
and indicate that parties try to separate themselves even from the average of similar incumbent 
European parties as all coefficients remain negative, statistically significant but with smaller 
values. We have performed a t-test for the significant difference between regression coefficients 
which indicate the existence of significant difference among them. Therefore, all foreign similar 
parties tend to be more influential than foreign similar incumbent parties as the coefficients are 
significant higher than the coefficients of foreign incumbent parties indicating a different result 
from this one of Böhmelt et al. (2016) who find that parties are respond to foreign incumbent but 
not to them of the same ideological bloc. 
Regarding control variables, the inflation rate seems to have a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 1% level for Centre-right parties, giving support to our expectations. 
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This result implies that higher inflation leads Centre-right-wing parties to further right positions 
in order to control inflation and avoid harmful distributive consequences for their target groups. 
In contrast, the interaction term of inflation rate with left-wing parties is negatively signed but 
statistically significant at the 10% level only in two regressions in columns (4) and (8), indicating 
that inflation have greater effect on right-wing parties (Hibbs, 1987). The rest of controls seem 
to have no effect on parties’ position as they have insignificant coefficients in all regressions. 
[Table 2, here] 
Moving one step forward, in Table 2, we estimate the baseline specification with the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. The results seem to remain the same with those of the 
baseline model in Table 1. Basically, the lagged dependent variable presents the position of a 
party at the previous election year, so it does not refer to a position of a fixed number of years 
ago (as it does in standard lagged dependent variable specifications), but to position at the last 
election, which varies across countries (Ward et al., 2011). However, the variable previous 
position does not turn out to be statistically significant, implying that political parties are not 
influenced by their position at the previous elections. This finding is not consistent with findings 
of previous studies (e.g. Adams et al., 2009; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014) but this can be attributed 
to basic differences in model specification as we do not use differences of parties’ position.26 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In this sub-section we carry out an additional analysis in order to evaluate the robustness of our 
main findings for economic, social and total globalization. All the robustness tests explored with 
respect to the econometric approach applied. First we check if our results are influenced by cross-
sectional dependence, i.e., the correlation among units (parties in our case). Second, we estimate 
our results using some alternative control variables and a Jackknife type analysis. Finally, we 
perform an instrumental variable approach in order to mitigate concerns for potential endogeneity 
or omitted variable bias.27 
4.2.1 Testing for cross-sectional dependence 
The first type of robustness test confirms that the existence of cross-sectional dependence does 
not cause problems in our estimates. In general, panel data sets are likely to appear cross-sectional 
                                                          
26Adams et al. (2009) and Ezrow & Hellwig (2014) using differences of parties’ positions find that parties shift their 
position to the opposite direction from their shifts in the previous election. 
27 The baseline model and robustness tests have also been estimated with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
and produce the same results; estimations are available upon request. 
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dependence due to common shocks or unobservable factors that become part of error term or due 
to pair-wise dependence in the disturbances (DeHoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). By performing the 
Pesaran’s (2004) CD test we find it necessary to re-estimate the baseline model, correcting for 
cross-sectional dependence and ensuring that the main findings remain unchanged.     
[Table 3, here] 
 Given that in our panel dataset the number of parties is equal to 34 while number of year is 
equal to 40, we re-estimate the main specification using Driscoll and Kraay estimator (see 
Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which is robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence (Hoechle, 2007).28 Additionally, we estimate the baseline model with Panel Correct 
Standard Errors (PCSE) as well, which is a parametric method to correct contemporaneous cross-
sectional dependence29. The estimated results are presented in Table 3, where the first four 
columns represent the Driscoll-Kraay estimates while the last four columns represent the PCSE 
estimates. Although the regressions include all the control variables, we present only these that 
are of interest. As we can see the empirical findings remain qualitatively identical to those 
depicted in Table 1, as all the variables appear similar coefficients, sign  and statistical 
significance.  
4.2.2 Alternative Controls and Jackknife estimations 
The next robustness check is the use of alternative control variables such as unemployment rate 
and GDP per capita. In Table 4, columns (1) - (3) displays the baseline regression with the log of 
GDP per capita instead of both growth rate and relative income, while columns (4) - (6) show the 
same regression with unemployment rate instead of inflation rate. We also include an interaction 
term between unemployment and left-wing parties, as we do for inflation rate, because left-wing 
parties might respond to unemployment differently from right-wing parties (Hibbs, 1987). Note 
that we do not include unemployment and inflation rate in the same regression because they are 
correlated to each other according to Phillips Curve, as well as growth rate is related to 
unemployment rate via Okun’s law. Results remain unaltered in every column in Table 4. 
[Table 4, here] 
                                                          
28  Estimated results are based on four-lag correction for autocorrelation including two-way fixed effects, however, 
results are robust to decrease the lag structure to three, two or one lags; estimates of other lag structures are available 
upon request. 
29 Both methods are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. According to contemporaneous cross-sectional 
dependence the cross-sectional correlations are the same for every pair of cross-sectional units. 
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  In Table 5 we replicate the fixed effects estimates of the baseline model, performing a 
Jackknife type analysis, by excluding one party each time. Columns (1) and (3) display the min 
and max value (respectively) of the coefficients of the main independent variable according to 
Jackknife estimates. Columns (2) and (4) present the political party that has the corresponding 
min and max value, while column (5) presents the estimated coefficient of our baseline model 
(see Table 1). As can be seen the estimated coefficients of total, economic, social and political 
globalization in Table 1 belong in the interval between their max and min value and the Jackknife 
exercise suggest that no single party drive the main results. 
[Table 5, here] 
4.2.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) Strategy 
Most of the studies that examine the responsiveness of party’s position do not perform an 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis supposing that the reverse causality issue cannot exist since 
they do not use implemented policies as regressors. Nevertheless, we consider important to deal 
with issue of omitted variable bias as well as reverse causality, i.e. the fact that globalization is 
affected by parties’ positions. We do this through a 2SLS identification strategy, instrumenting 
for all types of globalization that are found to have a strong effect on parties’ positions (i.e. total, 
economic, social and political globalization) and their interaction terms. 
 The challenge in our case is to find a valid instrument which is adequately correlated with 
all globalization indices and remain uncorrelated with parties’ positions and the disturbances. It 
considers as challenge because KOF indices of globalization are components of a variety of 
variables, and that necessitates the use of an instrument that affects globalization but is not 
included in any of the indices of globalization. Given all the above, we use as an instrument the 
human capital index which is highly correlated with all indices of globalization (total, economic, 
social and political) with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.7 and zero correlated with parties’ 
ideological positions.30 
 The motivation for choosing this instrument rests on studies that have found a positive 
relationship between globalization and human capital (e.g. Hickman and Olney, 2011). Countries 
with higher human capital tend to be more globalized either economically, socially or politically. 
Therefore, we expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient of human capital index in 
                                                          
30 Human capital index (HCI) is based on years of schooling and comes from Penn World Table (8.0). 
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the first stage. Lastly, we use the lagged value of the instrumented variable as an additional 
instrument to increase the first stage fit. 
[Table 6, here] 
 Table 6 presents the IV fixed effects regression with robust standard errors and year 
dummies. Panel A represents the second stage estimates, instrumenting globalization (total, 
economic, social and political) with human capital index (HCI) and one lag of globalization 
(Globalization_t-1), as well as instrumenting the interaction term of globalization with the 
interaction term of human capital with dummy left (HCIxleft) and the interaction term of one lag 
of globalization with dummy left (Globalization_t-1xleft). Although we include all the control 
variables of the baseline specification in IV model, we present only the independent variables of 
interest. Panel B represents the first stage estimates where instruments are regressed on 
instrumental variables. As we use interactions for globalization, we instrument both globalization 
and globalizationxleft. As we can see, the excluded instruments F statistic exceeds 10 at almost 
every regression,31 indicating that the instruments are sufficiently strong (Staiger and Stocks, 
1997). 
 Our theoretical priors are confirmed as the human capital index in the first stage has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient, denoting that has a positive impact on 
globalization. In the second stage (Panel A) the coefficients of total, economic and social 
globalization, as well as their interaction terms with dummy left, remain the same in terms of 
both statistical significant and sign, as in our prior estimates. In addition, the coefficient of 
Foreign_party_position still has the same sign and statistical significant with this in Table 1 in 
all the regressions. 
 Regarding the validity of our instruments, in all regressions the Cragg-Donald F-statistic 
(Cragg-Donald_F_stat.) is above the critical values produced by Stock-Yogo, which implies the 
rejection of null hypothesis of weak identified model. In addition, the statistical significance of 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic (K-P_rk_Lm_stat) at the 1% level implies the rejection of 
underidentification assumption; therefore, the model is not underidentified. Finally, the whole 
results indicate that the main findings in Table 1 are strong and valid under many specifications 
and robustness tests. 
                                                          
31 The F statistic (see estimate in Panel A) does not exceed 10 only in column (4) where political globalization is 
instrumented with human capital index.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Since the mid-20th century, globalization has significantly increased especially in European 
countries, affecting the economic, social and political conditions in many levels. As the pace of 
globalization is quite intense, it is important to determine the effect of the multifaceted nature of 
globalization on political parties that seek to participate in the government.  This paper explores 
the relationship between different dimensions of globalization – economic, social and political – 
and the ideological positions that parties strategically select in their electoral programs. We do so 
through a panel dataset of 17 Western European countries over the period 1970-2010 using fixed-
effects estimates and robust clustered standard errors. 
Considering the ideological principles of political parties and their target groups of voters 
the analysis accounts for potential differences in responsiveness to globalization among left- and 
right-wing parties. Three main findings derive from the empirical analysis. First, parties are found 
to respond differently to globalization depending on their ideological bloc, causing a party system 
convergence towards left. Specifically, Centre-right parties adopt more left positions in an 
increase globalization, whereas left-wing parties do not alter their position or move rightward. 
Second, all dimensions of globalization – economic, social and political – are found to be 
influential for parties’ ideological positions. 
 Third, the empirical analysis gives support to another argument that benefits us to better 
understand the role of competition for parties. According to this, political parties respond to the 
average trend of foreign parties’ positions of the same ideological bloc but they do not emulate 
them. The same result appears even when we account for the average of foreign incumbent parties 
which seem to be less influential. Thus, the findings indicate that parties do not consider the 
average of parties’ positions in the rest of Europe as a successful strategic choice. 
 Although the main empirical model is based on an annual panel dataset we have also re-
estimate the main specification including only election years verifying that the findings remain 
the same. We also test the robustness of fixed effects estimates carrying out additional 
econometric analysis. First, we ensure that the estimated results are not problematic to the 
existence of cross-sectional dependence which is likely to appear in panel datasets. Second, we 
test if the results remain the same under the use of alternative control variables. Next, we control 
if the estimates come from a single party by performing a Jackknife technique which excludes 
one party each time. Finally, we carry out an instrumental variable analysis dealing with the issue 
of omitted variable bias and reverse causality. 
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 The analysis in total seems to be in contrast with the view held in the literature that 
globalization leads parties to more right positions (Rodrik, 1997; Garrett, 2001) and studies that 
find evidence about a convergence to the right (Ward et al., 2011) or no convergence (Haupt, 
2010). Globalization of all aspects seems to lead parties to more left positions protecting the lower 
middle class that increasingly feel vulnerable to globalization. This evidence could help policy 
discussion about parties’ responses to environment incentives such as domestic economic, social 
and political conditions. 
 The results taken all together suggest that parties choose their position influenced by all 
aspects of globalization. Thus, globalization is worth considering as multifaceted phenomenon 
since all dimensions (economic, social and political) are found to strongly affect party’s 
positioning choice and hence have implications for party competition. Finally, there are several 
interesting questions to explore in future research, such as what are the implications for smaller 
parties in these systems. Based in this research and empirical analysis future studies can identify 
if the influence of globalization is equally strong for niche parties as well.  
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Table 1 Party’s position in response to globalization: Basic findings 
                 D.V: Party’s Ideological Position 
                                       (1)              (2)               (3)             (4)               (5)                (6)                (7)              (8) 
Total_globalization -0.752** -1.104***       
 (-2.500) (-3.461)       
Total_global.xleft 0.574** 1.341***       
 (2.588) (4.841)       
Econ._globalization   -0.647** -0.869***                    
   (-2.333) (-3.253)                    
Econ_global.xleft   0.525** 0.884***                    
   (2.439) (4.015)                    
Social_globalization     -0.363** -0.555***                  
     (-2.114) (-3.274)                  
Social_global.xleft     0.476*** 0.956***                  
     (2.736) (4.457)                  
Politic_globalization       -0.316 -0.317**  
       (-1.461) (-2.103)    
Political_global.xleft       0.308 0.421**  
       (1.363) (2.288)    
Foreign_party_position  -2.317***  -1.944***  -2.091***  -1.617*** 
  (-5.454)  (-4.508)  (-5.622)  (-3.887)    
Growth_rate  0.092  0.091  0.143  0.134    
  (0.361)  (0.383)  (0.550)  (0.540)    
Relative_income  -6.623  -8.461  -2.861  -3.886    
  (-1.185)  (-1.273)  (-0.769)  (-0.729)    
Inflation  0.481***  0.822**  0.566**  1.162*** 
  (2.814)  (2.673)  (2.534)  (3.665)    
Inflation.xleft  -0.380  -0.881*  -0.383  -1.456*** 
  (-0.956)  (-1.962)  (-0.851)  (-3.209)    
Dependency  -6.182  -3.861  0.969  -4.615    
  (-0.284)  (-0.177)  (0.041)  (-0.162)    
Eff_No._parties  0.844  0.778  1.102  0.866    
  (1.012)  (0.936)  (1.279)  (0.939)    
N  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  34 
Observations 1288 1247 1288 1247 1288 1247 1288 1247 
R-squared 0.14 0.25 0.13 0.23 0.13 0.24 0.10 0.19 
 
Notes: All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors. 
t - statistics in parentheses.  *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
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Table 2 Party’s position in response to globalization, inclusion of lagged dependent variable 
                 D.V: Party’s Ideological Position 
                                                    (1)                              (2)                            (3)                              (4) 
Previous_position -0.023 -0.014 -0.018 0.031    
 (-0.270) (-0.163) (-0.193) (0.343)    
Total_globalization -1.182***                    
 (-3.209)                    
Total_global.xleft 1.470***                    
 (4.597)                    
Econ._globalization  -0.905***   
  (-3.239)   
Econ_global.xleft  0.914***   
  (3.645)   
Social_globalization   -0.609***  
   (-2.871)  
Social_global.xleft   1.056***  
   (4.061)  
Politic_globalization    -0.313* 
    (-1.825) 
Political_global xleft    0.399* 
    (1.935) 
Foreign_party_position -2.410*** -1.929*** -2.140*** -1.536*** 
 (-4.549) (-3.644) (-4.561) (-3.050)    
Growth_rate -0.030 -0.047 0.025 -0.008    
 (-0.116) (-0.201) (0.099) (-0.031)    
Relative_income -5.019 -7.167 -1.287 -2.509    
 (-0.832) (-0.994) (-0.313) (-0.456)    
Inflation 0.436** 0.825** 0.508* 1.121*** 
 (2.081) (2.257) (1.919) (3.270)    
Inflation.xleft -0.382 -0.943* -0.356 -1.469*** 
 (-0.879) (-1.866) (-0.691) (-2.918)    
Dependency -1.987 -1.295 3.985 -3.659    
 (-0.089) (-0.057) (0.167) (-0.135)    
Eff_No._parties 0.853 0.729 1.060 0.700    
 (1.002) (0.844) (1.186) (0.764)    
N  34  34  34  34 
Observations 1174 1174 1174 1174 
R-squared 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.18 
 
Notes: All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors. 
t - statistics in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
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Table 3 Correcting cross-sectional dependence 
                    D.V: Party’s Ideological Position                       
                              Driscoll-Kraay estimates                  Panel Correct Standard Errors (PCSE) 
                                         (1)             (2)                (3)              (4)               (5)              (6)              (7)              (8) 
Total_globalization -1.104***    -0.604***    
 (-5.321)    (-3.239)    
Total_global.xleft 1.341***    0.780***    
 (6.360)    (4.560)    
Econ._globalization  -0.869***    -0.742***   
  (-4.940)    (-4.350)   
Econ_global.xleft  0.884***    0.647***   
  (5.857)    (3.883)   
Social_globalization   -0.555***    -0.277***  
   (-4.369)    (-2.619)  
Social_global.xleft   0.956***    0.582***  
   (5.843)    (4.988)  
Politic_globalization    -0.317***    -0.206** 
    (-2.823)    (-1.974) 
Political_global xleft    0.421***    0.35*** 
    (3.283)    (2.658) 
Foreign_party_posit. -2.317*** -1.944*** -2.091*** -1.617*** -0.794*** -0.658*** -0.721*** -0.580*** 
 (-8.681) (-6.892) (-7.893) (-5.255) (-4.373) (-3.722) (-4.085) (-3.298) 
N  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  34 
Observations 1247 1247 1247 1247 1247 1247 1247 1247 
R-squared 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.34 
 
Notes: Regressions in the first four columns are estimated with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, including two-
way fixed effects and are based on four lags; nevertheless, the results are robust to decrease the lag structure to three, 
two or one lags. Regressions in the last four columns are estimated with panel correct standard errors (PCSE) 
including year and party dummies. 
t - statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
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Table 4 Alternative independent variables 
                    D.V: Party’s Ideological Position 
                               Inflation and GDP per capita                      Unemployment and GDP per capita 
                                         (1)              (2)              (3)              (4)              (5)              (6)              (7)              (8) 
Total_globalization -1.05***    -1.11***    
 (-3.563)    (-3.361)    
Total_global.xleft 1.34***    1.42***    
 (4.866)    (5.200)    
Econ_globalization  -0.81***    -0.96***   
  (-3.374)    (-3.581)   
Econ_global.xleft  0.88***    1.01***   
  (4.059)    (4.661)   
Social_globalization   -0.55***    -0.56***  
   (-3.320)    (-3.095)  
Social_global.xleft   0.95***    0.99***  
   (4.506)    (4.939)  
Politic_globalization    -0.32**    -0.44** 
    (-2.106)    (-2.118) 
Political_global xleft    0.42**    0.64** 
    (2.265)    (2.266) 
Foreign_party_posit. -2.31*** -1.94*** -2.09*** -1.61*** -2.27*** -1.83*** -2.08*** -1.17** 
 (-5.457) (-4.524) (-5.644) (-3.896) (-5.254) (-3.995) (-5.580) (-2.623) 
 ln_GDP_per_capita -12.20 -13.94 -9.17 -11.08 -17.77 -24.45* -18.12 -20.50 
 (-1.392) (-1.345) (-1.151) (-1.034) (-1.421) (-1.713) (-1.434) (-1.223) 
Inflation 0.43** 0.75** 0.54** 1.12***     
 (2.497) (2.338) (2.366) (3.524)     
Inflation.xleft -0.38 -0.88* -0.38 -1.45***     
 (-0.964) (-1.992) (-0.855) (-3.211)     
Unemployment     -0.06 -0.17 -0.23 -0.76 
     (-0.157) (-0.365) (-0.495) (-1.252) 
Unemp.xleft     0.17 0.39 0.19 1.21 
     (0.249) (0.578) (0.259) (1.490) 
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 1247 1247 1247 1247 1127 1127 1127 1127 
R-squared 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.18 
 
Notes: All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors. 
t - statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
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Table 5 Jackknife Estimates 
 Regression with total globalization 
                               Min_coef.          Party             Max_coef.         Party                Estimated_coef. 
                                   (1)                    (2)                               (3)                  (4)                               (5) 
Total_globalization     -1.264***   Centre-right (Portugal)           -0.919***  Centre-right (Finland)        -1.104*** 
Total_global.xleft         1.160***   Centre-right (Finland)             1.450***   Centre-left (Austria)           1.341*** 
Foreign_parties           -2.421***   Centre-left (Luxembourg)      -2.011***   Centre-left (Finland)           -2.317*** 
 Regression with economic globalization 
                               Min_coef.          Party             Max_coef.         Party                Estimated_coef. 
                                   (1)                    (2)                               (3)                  (4)                               (5) 
Econ_globalization     -0.948***   Centre-right (Greece)            -0.615***   Centre-right (Finland)         -0.869*** 
Econ_global.xleft         0.669***   Centre-right (Finland)             0.962***   Centre-left (Austria)             0.884*** 
Foreign_parties           -2.107***   Centre-left (Luxembourg)      -2.166***   Centre-right (Finland)         -1.944*** 
 Regression with social globalization 
                               Min_coef.          Party             Max_coef.         Party                Estimated_coef. 
                                   (1)                    (2)                               (3)                  (4)                               (5) 
Social_globalization   -0.641***   Centre-right (Portugal)           -0.484***   Centre-right (Finland)         -0.555*** 
Social_global.xleft       0.846***   Centre-right (Finland)             1.039***    Centre-right (Belgium)         0.956*** 
Foreign_parties           -2.173***   Centre-left (Ireland)               -1.821***    Centre-left (Finland)           -2.091*** 
 Regression with political globalization 
                               Min_coef.          Party             Max_coef.         Party                Estimated_coef. 
                                   (1)                    (2)                               (3)                  (4)                               (5) 
Politic_globalization   -0.458***   Centre-right (German)           -0.239         Centre-right (Greece)          -0.317 
Politic_global.xleft       0.332         Centre-left (Finland)               0.552***   Centre-right (German)          0.421*** 
Foreign_parties           -1.739***   Centre-right (Luxembourg)   -2.166***   Centre-left (Finland)            -1.617*** 
 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) present the min and max value (respectively) of coefficients of the independent variables 
according to Jackknife estimates. Columns (2) and (4) present the political party that has the corresponding value 
and Column (5) presents the estimated coefficients of our baseline model (see Table1) in order to verify that they 
belong in the interval between their min and max value. All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are 
estimated with robust clustered standard errors. 
*,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% 
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Table 6 Instrumental Variable Estimates 
                    Panel A: Second-stage estimates with fixed effects and robust standard errors 
                                         (1)             (2)              (3)             (4)              (5)              (6)            (7)            (8) 
Total_globalization -1.481***    -1.259***    
 (-2.978)    (-7.733)    
Total_globalxleft 1.618***    1.435***    
 (8.141)    (9.009)    
Econ_globalization  -1.302***    -0.887***   
  (-2.990)    (-7.074)   
Econ_globalxleft  1.474***    0.886***   
  (7.949)    (7.182)   
Social_globalization   -1.286***    -0.670***  
   (-2.624)    (-6.332)  
Social_globalxleft   1.202***    1.035***  
   (7.801)    (9.180)  
Politic_globalization    -2.993**    -0.469*** 
    (-2.525)    (-3.591) 
Pol_globalxleft    4.406***    0.579*** 
    (5.820)    (3.451) 
Foreign_party_pos. -2.496*** -2.397*** -2.378*** -3.577*** -2.375*** -1.991*** -2.236*** -1.693*** 
 (-9.424) (-9.094) (-9.114) (-7.579) (-9.791) (-8.548) (-9.615) (-6.957) 
Observations 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 
F-stat_excl_instr[a] 48.44 37.46 17.49 4.17 557.41 3320 249.13 217.10 
F-stat_excl_instr[b] 278.29 175.27 233.59 15.88 1567 3598 757.59 134.71 
Cragg-Donald F-stat 38.06*** 27.13*** 12.77*** 6.20* 1167*** 2971*** 776.7*** 793.8*** 
K-P_rk_Lm-statistic  90.98*** 65.84*** 31.79*** 8.79*** 372.9*** 413.1*** 290.8*** 214*** 
 
                       Panel B: First-stage estimates 
      (1a)           (2a)             (3a)            (4a)            (5a)          (6a)           (7a)           (8a) 
            Total.glob    Econ.glob     Soc.glob      Pol.glob    Total.glob  Econ.glob   Soc.glob    Pol.glob 
 
      (1b)           (2b)             (3b)            (4b)           (5b)          (6b)           (7b)           (8b)
            Totalxleft     Econxleft      Socxleft      Polxleft     Totalxleft   Econxleft   Socxleft     Polxleft 
 
Notes: Panel A represents 2SLS estimates. Cragg-Donald_F_stat. is the Cragg-Donald weak identification test with 
the null hypothesis of weak identified model. K-P_rk_Lm_stat is the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test with 
the null hypothesis of underidentified model. Panel B represents the first stage estimates and the excluded 
instruments F statistic. Every 2SLS estimate has two regressions on the first stage as we instrument both 
globalization and globalizationxleft, which reflect to columns (1a)-(6a) and (1b)-(6b), respectively. Globalization_t-
1 and Globalization_t-1xleft represent the type of globalization indicated in each column.  
t - statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
HCI 7.590*** 8.825*** 7.643*** 5.794*** 0.269 0.456 0.525 0.165 
 (8.037) (6.811) (4.927) (2.723) (0.441) (0.701) (0.566) (0.162) 
HCIxleft -0.781 -0.248 -0.944 -1.286 0.152 -0.018 -0.304 0.003 
 (-0.754) (-0.160) (-0.557) (-0.634) (0.179) (-0.023) (-0.258) (0.002) 
Global_t-1     0.889*** 0.945*** 0.840*** 0.846*** 
     (35.535) (72.944) (24.122) (20.738) 
Global_t-1xleft     -0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 
     (-0.219) (0.204) (0.116) (0.052) 
HCI -8.020*** -8.629*** -11.969*** -1.560 -0.108 0.573** -0.802** -0.366 
 (-10.731) (-9.720) (-10.867) (-1.538) (-0.445) (2.170) (-2.026) (-0.790) 
HCIxleft 22.231*** 25.629*** 30.691*** 7.774*** 0.756 -0.439 2.148*** 0.829 
 (23.418) (18.718) (21.350) (5.301) (1.115) (-0.746) (2.598) (0.990) 
Global_t-1     -0.016 -0.003 -0.021*** 0.007 
     (-1.577) (-0.377) (-2.630) (0.554) 
Global_t-1xleft     0.916*** 0.953*** 0.891*** 0.835*** 
     (41.240) (78.562) (30.628) (18.579) 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 Parties included in the empirical analysis 
  
Note: Designations are taken from the Manifesto Project 
 
 
Country Left-wing Party Right-wing Party 
Austria Social Democratic Party People's Party 
Belgium Francophone Socialist Party Christian People's Party 
Denmark Social Democratic Party Christian People's Party 
Finland Social Democrats Christian Union 
France Socialist Party Union for French Democracy 
Germany Social Democratic Party Christian Democrats 
Great Britain Labor Party Conservative Party 
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement New Democracy 
Ireland Labor Party Family of Irish 
Italy Socialist Party Christian Democrats 
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party Christian Social People's Party 
Netherlands Labor Party Christian Democratic Appeal 
Norway Labor Party Christian People’s Party 
Portugal Socialist Party Centre Social Democrats 
Spain Socialist Workers' Party People’s Party 
Sweden Social Democratic Labor Party Christian Democratic Community 
Switzerland Social Democratic Party Christian Democrats 
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Table A2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable            Mean     St. Dev.    Min       Max        Source 
Party’s position -6.94 19.65 -58.11 78.85 Manifesto Project 
Centre-Left parties              -18.74 14.90 -58.11 43.24 Manifesto Project 
Centre-Right parties              5.53 16.04 -24.37 78.85 Manifesto Project 
Total globalization                75.27 11.19 49.02 92.72 Dreher et al. (2006a) 
Economic globalization 73.45 14.22 42.85 98.88 Dreher et al. (2006a) 
Social globalization 69.99 14.35 36.73 91.25 Dreher et al. (2006a) 
Political globalization 85.30 12.92 45.9 98.43 Dreher et al. (2006a) 
Foreign parties’ positions -6.41 12.15 -32.61 12.47 Constructed 
Growth rate 2.18 2.63 -8.71 13.62 World Bank 
Relative income 1 0.44 0.25 2.82 Constructed 
Dependency ratio 0.52 0.05 0.43 0.73 World Bank 
Inflation rate 5.85 5.46 -5.2 27.21 World Bank 
Effective No. parties 4.55 1.6 2.27 10.29 Armingeon et al.  (2015) 
GDP per capita 30548 13435 7487 86127 World Bank 
Unemployment rate               6.09 3.74 0 20.06 OECD Economic Outlook (2013) 
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Table A3 Basic findings using the average of foreign incumbent parties 
                 D.V: Party’s Ideological Position 
                                                        (1)                             (2)                              (3)                                (4) 
Total_globalization -0.978***                    
 (-2.979)                    
Total_global.xleft 1.013***                    
 (3.886)                    
Econ._globalization  -0.868***                   
  (-2.991)                   
Econ_global.xleft  0.786***                   
  (3.444)                   
Social_globalization   -0.430**                  
   (-2.583)                  
Social_global.xleft   0.737***                  
   (3.492)                  
Politic_globalization    -0.271*   
    (-1.874)    
Political_global xleft    0.325**  
    (2.177)    
Foreign_incum_parties -1.707*** -1.655*** -1.564*** -1.402*** 
 (-5.985) (-5.523) (-5.958) (-4.989)    
Growth_rate 0.061 0.059 0.117 0.110    
 (0.254) (0.256) (0.470) (0.466)    
Relative_income -6.566 -8.669 -2.352 -3.427    
 (-1.251) (-1.512) (-0.643) (-0.702)    
Inflation 0.469** 0.735** 0.573** 1.087*** 
 (2.219) (2.325) (2.319) (3.323)    
Inflation.xleft -0.307 -0.670 -0.316 -1.268*** 
 (-0.727) (-1.505) (-0.691) (-2.950)    
Dependency -6.519 -3.559 0.257 -5.102    
 (-0.287) (-0.169) (0.011) (-0.180)    
Eff_No._parties 0.947 0.858 1.196 0.962    
 (1.098) (1.046) (1.365) (1.067)    
N 34 34 34 34 
Observations 1247 1247 1247 1247 
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.20 
 
Notes: All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors. 
t - statistics in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
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Table A4 Basic findings including only election years 
                 D.V: Party’s Ideological Position 
                                                        (1)                             (2)                             (3)                             (4) 
Total_globalization -1.065**                    
 (-2.598)                    
Total_global.xleft 0.924**                    
 (2.584)                    
Econ._globalization  -0.668**                   
  (-2.327)                   
Econ_global.xleft  0.623**                   
  (2.473)                   
Social_globalization   -0.533**                  
   (-2.189)                  
Social_global.xleft   0.669**                  
   (2.275)                  
Politic_globalization    -0.289    
    (-1.257)    
Political_global xleft    0.283    
    (1.169)    
Foreign_party_position -1.301*** -1.070** -1.090*** -0.784**  
 (-3.044) (-2.594) (-2.951) (-2.152)    
Growth_rate -0.094 -0.109 -0.002 -0.070    
 (-0.181) (-0.211) (-0.004) (-0.133)    
Relative_income -18.224*** -15.665** -13.096** -13.521**  
 (-3.002) (-2.320) (-2.676) (-2.481)    
Inflation 0.980*** 1.336*** 1.054** 1.582*** 
 (2.736) (3.393) (2.697) (4.170)    
Inflation.xleft -0.383 -0.759* -0.338 -1.124*** 
 (-0.943) (-1.741) (-0.733) (-3.027)    
Dependency -56.753** -51.049* -49.253* -56.917*   
 (-2.212) (-1.977) (-1.860) (-1.779)    
Eff_No._parties 0.628 0.331 0.780 0.384    
 (0.562) (0.307) (0.668) (0.366)    
N 34 34 34 34 
Observations 351 351 351 351 
R-squared 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.27 
 
Notes: All regressions include two-way fixed effects and are estimated with robust clustered standard errors. 
t - statistics in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
 
